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France and the Israeli occupation: Talking the talk, but not walking the walk?  
 
Benedetta Voltolini, King’s College London1 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This article examines the rhetoric-practice gap in French foreign policy vis-à-vis Israel’s 
occupation of the Palestinian territories. It shows that France has maintained a rather stable 
rhetorical position on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the Israeli occupation since 1967, 
based on the condemnation of Israeli settlements in these areas, and the recognition of the 
Palestinian right to self-determination which, over time, has been crystallised in the French 
support for the two-state solution. However, in practice France has fallen short of implementing 
and enforcing measures and policies aimed at the non-recognition of Israeli settlements. France 
tries to push for the two-state solution internationally, while adopting an accommodating 
approach towards the occupation when it comes to its bilateral relations with Israel. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The Middle East has always played an important role in French foreign policy and the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict has often been defined as ‘une passion française’ (Sieffert, 2004). Not only 
does the situation in Israel and Palestine come high on the political agenda, but it has also had 
a great deal of resonance among French politicians, diplomats, intellectuals and public opinion 
(Benraad, 2014; Gresh & Aldeguer, 2017). This is not at all surprising, given the presence of 
important Jewish and Muslim communities in France, of a large French-speaking community 
in Israel, as well as French history, marked by its colonial past, the legacies of World War II 
and the collusion of the Vichy regime with the Nazi enterprise (Gresh & Aldeguer, 2017; 
Interview 1, 7).  
 
French foreign policy vis-à-vis the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been characterised by 
interweaving strands. On the one hand, since 1967 the French position vis-à-vis the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict and the Israeli occupation of the West Bank, Gaza Strip, East Jerusalem and 
the Golan Heights has been rather stable, with minor adjustments over time. This stance is based 
on the condemnation of Israel’s occupation and the building of settlements in these areas, and 
the recognition of the Palestinian right to self-determination which, over time, has crystallised 
in the French support for the two-state solution. This consistent and principled rhetoric has been 
strongly promoted internationally, both at the United Nations (UN) and within the European 
Union (EU), often leading to portraying France as a pro-Arab and pro-Palestinian actor. On the 
other hand, French-Israeli relations have fluctuated over time. Bilateral ties were strong during 
the IV République, cooled down in the early 1960s and became tense after 1967. Only in the 
mid-2000s diffidence and tension were superseded in favour of a renewed rapprochement and 
a discourse of friendship, cooperation and alliance.  
 
The tension between these two strands is partially solved by playing on different stages. At the 
international and European level France has been particularly active in carving out a role in 
support of the two-state solution and in favour of the Palestinian cause, while it has dealt with 
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Israel mainly via bilateral ties. However, the mismatch between French rhetoric against Israeli 
occupation of the Palestinian territories and French practice vis-à-vis Israel remains. The 
implementation and enforcement of measures and policies aimed at the non-recognition of 
Israeli settlements are at best very partial. France tries to push for the two-state solution 
internationally, but it adopts a more accommodating approach towards the occupation when it 
comes to bilateral relations with Israel. 
 
This article aims to provide the reader with a snapshot of this rhetoric-practice gap. First, it 
offers a historical overview of the French stance, detailing the two interwoven discursive 
strands mentioned above. In doing so, it highlights how France has maintained a stable position 
when it comes to the Palestinians and the condemnation of Israeli occupation, while developing 
since the mid-2000s a discourse leaning towards Israel. Second, it focuses on the partial 
implementation of its rhetorical stance against Israeli settlements, which leaves open the issue 
of (indirect) recognition of Israeli occupation (cf. Azarova 2018 in this Special Issue). Finally, 
the conclusions suggest an explanation for the mismatch between France’s rhetorical position 
and its partial implementation, briefly discussing how the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is turning 
into a domestic issue (cf. Bicchi 2018 in this Special Issue).  
 
France and Israel’s occupation: resistance at the discursive level? 
 
France’s position vis-à-vis Israel and the Palestinians is marked by two interwoven discourses. 
On the one hand, French position vis-à-vis Israel has shifted over time, moving from a strong 
and almost unconditional alliance in the 1950s and early 1960s, through a phase of tense and 
distant relations in the following decades, to a renewed discourse of friendship since the mid-
2000s. On the other hand, France’s stance vis-à-vis the Israeli-Palestinian conflict emerged after 
the Six-Day war of 1967 and has remained relatively stable since then. This section shows how 
these two rhetorical positions have evolved and remained strongly interwoven, creating a 
discursive mismatch between an anti-occupation rhetoric and a more lenient and conciliatory 
stance towards Israel. The potential tensions emerging from these two strands are only partially 
solved by carving out different roles for France on the national, EU and UN stages. 
 
During the IV République, France was one of the closest allies of Israel. It recognised the newly 
created state and establish diplomatic relations in 1949. French-Israeli cooperation was very 
tight, ranging from scientific to military aspects (Vaïsse, 2009). In the 1950s, France was the 
main supplier of military equipment to Israel through a number of secret deals that included 
aircrafts, tanks and ammunitions (cf. Nouzille, 2018; Schillo, 2008). It also played a crucial role 
in Israel’s acquisition of nuclear capabilities through the provision of know-how, material and 
technology. In a secret agreement signed in 1956 France committed to helping Israel build a 
nuclear reactor and to providing uranium. Nuclear capabilities were meant for civilian purposes, 
while military use was conditional upon consultation with, and agreement by, the French 
government (cf. Nouzille, 2018). At the time, France was the main ally of Israel and the 
Palestinian question was not yet perceived as a major issue. 
 
However, this strong cooperation and almost unconditional friendship began to be questioned 
once Charles de Gaulle came to power in 1958. Although the General considered Israel as ‘our 
friend and our ally’2 and military cooperation continued (e.g., 72 Mirage were delivered in 
1961), he decided for the interruption of nuclear cooperation with foreign countries, including 
Israel, and for the reorientation of French foreign policy in the region. The end of the war in 
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Algeria in 1962 created more room for manoeuvre for France and de Gaulle took up this 
opportunity to rebalance French policy with an opening and progressive relaunch of diplomatic 
relations with the Arab countries (Leveau, 2003; Vaïsse, 2009). 
 
A more radical shift in the French-Israeli relationship took place in 1967, with the Six-Day war. 
De Gaulle had made clear that France would support Israel in case of aggression, but it would 
not intervene if Israel were to start the hostilities. In his view, Israel was not seriously threatened 
by its Arab neighbours, and a conflict would have further damaged the balance in the region, 
with the risk of a much larger war between the US and the USSR (cf. Bozo, 2012; Nouzille, 
2018). Once Israel attacked its neighbouring countries, de Gaulle kept his promise by strongly 
condemning Israel’s attack and its occupation of Palestinian territories. In line with this stance, 
France supported UNSC Resolution 242, refusing any fait accompli and requesting the 
withdrawal of Israel from the occupied territories.3 Subsequent events continued to deteriorate 
the relations between France and Israel, leading to a cooling down of their bilateral ties. 
 
At the same time as French-Israeli cooperation came to an end, French position vis-à-vis the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict began to emerge, becoming the cornerstone of French diplomacy 
followed by all presidents. Following the 1967 war France was vocal in condemning Israel’s 
occupation and pushing for the recognition of the Palestinian right to self-determination 
(including the establishment of a state) and of the PLO as representative of the Palestinian 
people.4 It predominantly directed its diplomatic efforts at the European level, with the aim of  
aligning the then members of the European Economic Community (EEC) to its approach on the 
Palestinian question (cf. Allen & Pijpers, 1984; Miller, 2011). France thus succeded in shaping 
some European joint declarations, such as those in 1973, 1977 and the Venice declaration of 
1980, when the then nine EEC members recognised the Palestinian right to self-determination 
and the need for the PLO to be associated with peace negotiations (Müller, 2012). In 1980 the 
Europeans also stated that Israel had to put an end to ‘the territorial occupation which it has 
maintained since the conflict in 1967’ and that Israeli settlements in the ‘occupied Arab [sic] 
territories’ were ‘illegal under international law’.5  
 
This position continued under François Mitterrand, who came to power in 1981 and was 
expected to give a more pro-Israel line to French foreign policy due to his personal sympathy 
for Israel. However, he maintained the established policy vis-à-vis the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict and took ‘into full consideration the legitimacy of the Palestinian struggle’ (Filiu, 2009, 
p. 40). During his visit to Israel in March 1982, the first of a French president of the V 
République, Mitterrand proclaimed that there was a strong friendship between the French and 
Israeli peoples, but he also argued in favour of the rights of the Palestinians to have a state 
(although he did not mention the issue of the settlements).6 It was under Mitterrand that in 1989 
the PLO liaison office was upgraded into the Official Delegation of Palestine, while Arafat was 
invited to Paris (cf. Filiu, 2009; Vaïsse, 2009). 
 
Mitterrand’s successors also maintained this established and principled position on the 
occupation and the two-state solution. In line with Gaullist policies, Jacques Chirac (1995-
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2007) pursued a balanced policy in the region, reinforcing ties with Arab countries and 
confirming French support for the Oslo peace process (Vaïsse, 2009). Similarly, Nicolas 
Sarkozy (2007-2012) and François Hollande (2012-2017) continued to resist Israel’s 
occupation at the rhetorical level and expressed their support for the establishment of a 
Palestinian state. This was on display at the UN level, where France was able to show its 
commitment to the two-state solution and the condemnation of Israeli settlements. Paris voted 
in favour of Palestinian membership to the UNESCO in 2011,7 Palestine’s upgrade to as a non-
member observer state in November 20128 and the display of the Palestinian flag at the UN in 
September 2015.9 More recently, it supported UN Security Council Resolution 2334 of 23 
December 2016, in which the Security Council stated that settlements have no legal validity, 
are a flagrant violation under international law and a major obstacle to the two-state solution. It 
demanded for an immediate and complete cease of settlement activities, stated that it does not 
recognise any changes to the Green Line other than those agreed by Israelis and Palestinians, 
and calls upon all states to distinguish between Israel and the territories it occupied in 1967. 
Through its permanent representative at the UN, Ambassador François Delattre, France 
expressed full support for the resolution and saluted it as an important moment thanks to the 
clarity of the Council’s position on the settlements’ enterprise.10 
 
In parallel to this discourse, however, a partial shift in the French position vis-à-vis Israel started 
to emerge under Chirac. While French-Israeli relations were at times tense during his mandates, 
he was the first President to recognise the responsibility of the French state during the Vichy 
regime for the crimes committed against the Jews. In 1996, during a visit to Israel, he stated 
that ‘France and Israel have a privileged relationship’.11 During his second mandate, there was 
a certain fatigue in pushing the Middle East Peace Process dossier (Interview 1). In contrast, 
especially since the end of 2004, Chirac tried to re-establish close ties with Israel, also in an 
attempt to improve French relations with the United States (Interview 6; Nouzille, 2018). In 
2005, during a visit by the Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, France and Israel agreed to 
establish a France-Israel Foundation to improve their respective images in the two countries.12  
 
Chirac’s successors strengthened this rhetoric of friendship and alliance with the State of Israel. 
Sarkozy (2007-2012) openly expressed his sympathy for Israel even before becoming President 
in 2007. This is likely to be related to his personal experience (Nouzille, 2018) as well as the 
influence of the so-called néocons à la français, a group of people that considered the alliance 
with the US, and hence with Israel, a key and strategic priority for France (Interviews 1, 2).13 
Demonstrating profound attention to the French Jewish community, Sarkozy was the first 
President to go to the annual dinner organised by the Conseil Représentatif des Institutions 
Juives de France (CRIF), which has now become a place-to-be for French politicians. At the 
political level, an annual strategic dialogue between the Secretary-Generals of the Foreign 
                                                          
7 http://www.reuters.com/article/us-palestinians-unesco-idUSTRE79U1ZY20111101  
8 https://www.un.org/press/en/2012/ga11317.doc.htm  
9 https://www.un.org/press/en/2015/ga11676.doc.htm  
10 https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/dossiers-pays/israel-territoires-palestiniens/processus-de-
paix/evenements/article/proche-orient-explication-de-vote-de-francois-delattre-representant-permanent# 
11 http://discours.vie-publique.fr/notices/967015700.html  
12 ‘PM Sharon visit herald symbolic upturn in French-Israeli relations’, telegram of the US Embassy in Paris, 
01/08/2005, available at: https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/05PARIS5263_a.html; cf. 
http://www.fondationfranceisrael.org/qui-sommes-nous/missions  
13 The influence of this group of people is particularly evident on the Iranian nuclear proliferation dossier (cf. 
Pouponneau, 2015). According to one diplomat, the sway exerted by the neocons is less significant in the case of 
Israel-Palestine (Interview 7; but see Nouzille 2018 for a different account). 
  
Ministries of France and Israel started in 2009.14 Similarly, military cooperation was 
strengthened, covering both technological and operational aspects (Nouzille, 2018). Since 2000 
numerous branches of French firms have been established in Israel, employing more than 6,000 
people in sectors such as energy, consumer goods, infrastructure, health, transport, etc.15 
Moreover, French investments have more than tripled since 2006.  
 
Hollande (2012-2017) continued the policy initiated by his predecessor. During a visit to Israel 
in 2013, he declared his friendship to Israel and that he would always find a ‘chant d’amour’ 
for Israel and his leaders (Gresh & Aldeguer, 2017).16 Most importantly, despite France’s 
continued rhetorical support for Palestinian self-determination, Paris fell short of recognising 
Palestine as a state. The government did not follow up on a resolution in favour of recognition 
of the Assemblée Nationale in December 2014 (339 votes in favour, 151 against).17The 
government did not keep the promise made in January 2016 by the then foreign ministry 
Laurent Fabius, who declared that the French government was ready to recognise the 
Palestinian state, if diplomacy failed to lead to a solution.18 France indeed organised two 
international conferences on the Middle East, in June 2016 and January 2017, with the clear 
goal of relaunching the peace process. Although the situation between Israel and Palestine did 
not change, it was an opportunity for the international community to clearly state its position 
on the conflict (also vis-à-vis the Israeli government), the last time in which it was possible to 
reach a united stance within the international community on the dossier (Interview 7). Yet, 
despite the diplomatic failure to advance peace in the region, France did not follow up on 
Palestinian recognition, mainly due to Hollande’s opposition, who considered the decision 
politically too costly and as hampering any possibility for France to be a mediator (Interviews 
2, 7). 
 
Elected in May 2017, Emmanuel Macron has yet to clearly define its policy vis-à-vis the 
conflict. He has maintained a strong opposition to Israeli settlements, while also stressing the 
importance of French-Israeli bilateral relations. For example, in a press conference with Israeli 
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on 10 December 2017, Macron said that France considers 
the US’s declarations on the recognition of Jerusalem ‘contrary to international law and 
dangerous to peace’.19 At the same time, however, he also reaffirmed the ‘special relationship’ 
between France and Israel, to which France is ‘strongly attached’.20  
 
Therefore, while the rhetoric in favour of the two-state solution and against Israeli occupation 
has remained stable since 1967, the French position vis-à-vis Israel has fluctuated. The tensions 
at times emerging from these two strands have partially been solved by acting diplomatically 
                                                          
14 https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files/israel-palestinian-territories/israel/france-and-
israel/presentation/  
15 As documented by numerous NGOs, numerous French companies are involved in the settlement industry (cf. 
www.whoprofits.org). For example, Alstom, Systra and Egis Rail are involved in the construction of the 
Jerusalem Light Rail (Veolia was involved, but then withdrew from it) (http://www.france-
palestine.org/IMG/pdf/20180524_tramwaypalestine_livret_final_b.pdf ). Similarly, French banks finance Israeli 
banks or settlement activities (http://www.france-palestine.org/Les-liaisons-dangereuses-des-banques-et-
assurances-francaises-avec-la). See also Martins (2018) in this special issue.  
16 http://www.lepoint.fr/monde/pourquoi-hollande-defend-corps-et-ame-israel-18-11-2013-1758330_24.php; 
http://www.bfmtv.com/politique/francois-hollande-chant-damour-israel-654824.html  
17 http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/ta/ta0439.asp  
18 https://www.francetvinfo.fr/monde/proche-orient/israel-palestine/video-laurent-fabius-la-reconnaissance-de-
la-palestine-c-est-un-droit-pas-un-passe-droit_763967.html  
19http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/transcription-de-la-conference-de-presse-du-president-de-la-
republique-emmanuel-macron-et-du-premier-ministre-israelien-benyamin-netanyahou/  
20 Ibid. 
  
at the international and European level when it comes to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, while 
working at the bilateral level when it comes to Israel. As the next section will show, however, 
this has not addressed the mismatch between the rhetoric of resistance to Israeli occupation and 
the French bilateral policy practice. 
 
 
France and Israeli settlements in practice  
 
Despite its clear and consistent rhetoric of condemnation of Israel’s occupation, France’s 
implementation of such a position has been patchy. While it has supported (and at times been 
the driver of) EU measures aimed at the non-recognition of Israeli occupation, France’s track 
record at home and in bilateral dealings has been partial at best.  
 
At the EU level, France has backed the so-called ‘policy of differentiation’, i.e., the distinction 
between Israel within the 1967 border and its settlements in the Palestinian territories when it 
comes to bilateral dealings between the EU and Israel (Lovatt & Toaldo, 2015). The 
differentiation policy implies the ‘non-applicability in the occupied territories (i.e. in Israeli 
settlements) of legal regimes beneficial for Israel that are set up under EU law’ (Nikolov, 2014, 
p. 171). This has been the way embraced by European countries to make sure that they do not 
grant indirect recognition to occupation (cf. Azarova in this issue). Examples of this policy of 
differentiation have been the 2013 ‘Guidelines on the eligibility of Israeli entities and their 
activities in the territories occupied by Israel since June 1967 for grants, prizes and financial 
instruments funded by the EU from 2014 onwards’ and the 2015 ‘Interpretive Notice on 
indication of origin of goods coming from the territories occupied by Israel since June 1967’ 
(cf. Bicchi & Voltolini, 2018). France expressed support for these measures on different 
occasions, such as by signing a letter to the High Representative Catherine Ashton in 2013, 
asking for guidelines on the labelling of settlement goods, and by supporting the strong 
language of the draft Council Conclusions on the Middle East in January 2016, which was 
however watered down after Israel successfully managed to influence some member states 
(Lovatt, 2016). 
  
Yet, France’s performance at home and in bilateral agreements with Israel has been much more 
ambiguous. On the one hand, key EU decisions have been transposed at the national level. 
France published an advice concerning the implications for citizens and businesses in the 
occupied territories on the website of the Ministère de l'Europe et des Affaires étrangères 
(MEAE) in 2014.21 This followed the agreement taken in the Council’s Maghreb/Mashreq 
Working Group in June 2013 concerning the need for a common message that all member states 
should use to raise awareness among citizens and businesses of the economic, legal and 
reputational damages and risks they might incur if they engage in activities in or related to 
Israeli settlements. In its short notice, the Quai d’Orsay also included an invitation to those that 
intend to conduct economic or financial activities in the settlements to get a juridical opinion 
before proceeding. 
 
On the other hand, however, the actual implementation and enforcement of the differentiation 
policy, which pertains to national authorities, has been weak, as the case of labelling shows. 
According to EU legislation and as reiterated in the Interpretive Notice of November 2015, 
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labels indicating the origin of goods have to be precise and not misleading to the consumer.22  
Hence, settlement goods need to be labelled as ‘product from the Golan Heights (Israeli 
settlement)' or 'product from the West Bank (Israeli settlement)'. France reacted rather slowly 
to the issue of the Notice and it did so only in response to pressure from civil society 
organisations and the Parliament. The Plateforme des ONG françaises pour la Palestine and 
the Association France Palestine Solidarité sent letters to the Direction Générale de la 
Concurrence, de la Consommation e de la Répression des Fraudes (DGCCRF) – which is a 
department of the Ministry of Economics and Finance in charge of issues related to consumer 
protection, including the labelling of products – to inquire how the DGCCRF envisaged to take 
to ensure the implementation and enforcement of EU legislation.23 Numerous parliamentary 
questions on the subject were also tabled, inquiring how the government intended to correctly 
implement the EU’s notice.24 As a result of these different pressures, in September 2016 the 
government confirmed that the Ministry of Economics would be in charge of this.25 Shortly 
afterwards, on 24 November 2016 a notice to business actors was published in the Journal 
Officiel de la République Française.26 The DGCCRF recalled that the West Bank, East 
Jerusalem and the Golan Heights are not part of Israel according to international law. Therefore, 
the labelling of food products needs to precisely indicate the origin of the goods to properly 
inform consumers, meaning that labels for products coming from Israeli settlements have to 
include the mention ‘Israeli settlements’. Although the notice is partial, as it only refers to food 
products and does not specify which types of sanctions are imposed in case of violations of the 
labelling regulations, it is obviously the first step in the implementation of the declaratory stance 
against Israeli occupation.  
 
However, the trickiest part remains its enforcement. On the one hand, evidence collected by 
civil society organisations has shown that a majority of products continue to be labelled as 
‘Made in Israel’, even when goods come from the settlements. For example, the wine bottles 
produced by Golan Heights Winey (GWH) and sold by the French importer Casimex did not 
make any reference to the fact that the wine is produced in an Israeli settlement.27 Similarly, 
civil society actors have collected evidence in supermarkets, demonstrating how the regulation 
on labelling is not properly implemented and not enforced (Interview 3), and encouraging 
activists to send letters to the retailers and the DGCCRF when they encounter cases of non-
compliance.28 Three factors are likely to contribute to this. First, it is very difficult for retailers 
as well as French authorities to clearly distinguish between products from Israel and from its 
settlements. One of the main sources of information should be the EUR.1 certificate of origin 
which is produced when a product is imported into the EU under preferential treatment. Yet, 
distinguishing between Israeli and settlement goods is rather difficult, if not impossible due to 
the Israel’s postal code system of 2013, for customs authorities (Interviews 3, 4).29 Second, the 
DGCCRF has limited resources to ensure full enforcement of this legislation. Given the 
                                                          
22 The Notice refers to the specific pieces of legislation for separate sets of products such as fresh vegetables and 
fruit, cosmetics, wine, oil, etc. 
23 https://plateforme-palestine.org/La-mise-en-oeuvre-de-l-etiquetage-des-produits-des-colonies; 
https://plateforme-palestine.org/La-mise-en-oeuvre-de-l-etiquetage-differencie-des-produits-en-provenance-des 
24 http://palestine-nos-elus.org/spip.php?page=liste_nuage&id_mot=61  
25 http://questions.assemblee-nationale.fr/q14/14-96124QE.htm  
26 
https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do;jsessionid=AE9D6C55B501756D63EBDF11A39F4D43.tpdila09
v_2?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000033464109&dateTexte=&oldAction=rechJO&categorieLien=id&idJO=JORFCO
NT000033463474  
27 http://www.france-palestine.org/De-Vinisud-a-Casimex-les-colons-debusques  
28 http://www.france-palestine.org/Lettre-type-a-la-Direction-de-la-Protection-des-Populations-DDPP; 
http://www.france-palestine.org/Lettre-au-magasin-carrefour   
29 Cf. https://electronicintifada.net/blogs/david-cronin/checking-settlement-exports-impossible-eu-admits  
  
relatively small impact in economic terms, this is not the main priority of the Department. A 
similar difficulty is also voiced by retailers, which do not necessarily know how to ensure the 
correct implementation of the labelling regulation (Interviews 2, 3, 4). Finally, political will is 
absent. The higher (and political) levels in the hierarchy are not prepared to take further steps 
in this direction, hence not encouraging moves that would go for a stricter enforcement 
(Interview 3).  
 
More recently, the notice was challenged in front of the Conseil d’ Etat, the highest 
administrative jurisdiction in France, in 2017. The Organisation juive européenne and the 
winery society Psagot Ltd asked the Conseil to annul the notice published in 2016, arguing that 
the use of the word ‘settlement’ is political and goes beyond the purpose of EU legislation on 
the labelling of products, and that it imposes double standards on Israeli business actors, given 
that other cases of occupation are not treated in the same way.30 On 30 May 2018, the French 
court referred the case to the European Court of Justice (ECJ), asking whether the mention of 
‘settlement’ is permitted and/or imposed by EU law.31 While the referral delays the decision on 
the specific case, the implications will have EU-wide repercussions, as the ECJ’s interpretation 
will apply to all member states and will define whether the interpretation of EU law provided 
by the Commission in 2015 and then transposed into national notices by member states is in 
line with EU legislation.  
 
France’s differentiation policy is further deficient when bilateral agreements are scrutinised. 
Cooperation has developed across a wide range of issues, such as tourism, cinema, environment 
and R&D, with the prospect of further strengthening relations.32 So far, however, none of the 
existing bilateral agreements between France and Israel contains a clause limiting their 
territorial applicability to the territory of Israel within the 1967 border. This lack of a formal 
exclusion of settlements from bilateral treaties is not supplemented by informal measures that 
would limit the scope of application in practice. Because settlements are not left out, either 
formally or informally, Israel is hence in the position to implement these bilateral agreements 
in accordance with treaty law and Israeli law. This means that settlements as well as the 
occupied areas of East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, which have been annexed in 1980 and 
1981, are included by Israel.  
 
Therefore, rhetorical commitment against the occupation is often not accompanied by non-
recognition in practice. On the one hand, France condemns Israeli settlements, in accordance 
with international law and the consensus of the international community. It has often promoted 
tougher action at the international and EU level, supporting UN resolutions critical of 
settlements as well as the EU’s policy of differentiation. On the other, Paris tends to become 
much more accommodating of Israel’s occupation in practice, either via the lack of territorial 
clauses in its bilateral treaties with Israel or when it comes to the implementation and 
enforcement of concrete measures that would differentiate between Israel and its settlements.  
 
Conclusions 
 
Interwoven strands in French foreign policy vis-à-vis the Israeli-Palestinian conflict have led to 
a mismatch between French rhetoric on Israel occupation and French policy practice vis-à-vis 
                                                          
30 https://www.opinion-internationale.com/2018/05/29/etiquetage-des-produits-israeliens-et-droit-de-lunion-
europeenne-la-parole-est-au-conseil-detat-lanalyse-de-maitre-francois-henri-briard_53774.html  
31 Conseil d’Etat, Lecture du mercredi 30 mai 2018, No. 407147, ECLI:FR:CECHR:2018:407147.20180530. 
32 E.g., http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/transcription-de-la-conference-de-presse-du-president-de-la-
republique-emmanuel-macron-et-du-premier-ministre-israelien-benyamin-netanyahou/ 
  
Israel. On the one hand, France’s rhetorical position has remained consistent since 1967. It has 
always condemned Israeli occupation, while supporting the cause of a Palestinian state. Paris 
has acted rather consistently at both the UN and EU levels, supporting resolutions against the 
settlements and measures to differentiate between Israel and its settlements in EU-Israel 
dealings. While recent years have shown an increasing rapprochement towards Israel, the 
condemnation of the settlement enterprise and the support for the two-state solution continue 
to be the cornerstone of French policy. Yet, France’s performance in the implementation and 
enforcement stages still leaves margins of improvement. Not only has implementation of EU 
measures aimed at the non-recognition of Israeli settlements been sketchy, but there has been 
no substantial move in differentiating between Israel and its settlements at the level of France-
Israel bilateral treaties.  
 
Rhetoric-practice gaps are normal features in politics, so this is not at all surprising. While a 
similar gap at the EU level has been progressively closing (Bicchi & Voltolini, 2018), the 
tensions between different types of practices has not lead to a similar pattern in the case of 
French foreign policy. While more research is necessary, potential explanations for this 
persisting mismatch are to be found in French societal dynamics and how the actions, practices 
and narratives proposed by different domestic actors shape the formulation of French foreign 
policy. The lack of political willingness, which is often mentioned as the reason for the failure 
to recognise Palestine or to enforce the labelling regulation, emerges from deeper trends in 
French society. Despite attempts at avoiding that the conflict becomes a domestic issue, it is 
undeniable that it has a strong resonance and is very politicised in the French domestic debate.  
 
First of all, the pillars of French policy are contested by several societal groups that aim to 
influence the debate. Challenges range from the role and implications of international law and 
human rights law to antisemitism. Lobbying on the French government and Member of 
Parliaments come from opposite fronts, which try to shift French foreign policy in their 
preferred direction. For example, the CRIF has been particularly vocal in recent years on issues 
of French foreign policy towards Israel and of anti-Semitism (Ghiles Meilhac, 2011). It is 
considered as strongly influential, with a relatively easy access to the President and the Foreign 
Minister (Interview 7). Similarly, the Plateforme des ONG françaises pour la Palestine and the 
Association France Palestine Solidarité also aim to influence French policy in favour of 
Palestinian rights and lobby for an effective implementation of measures against Israeli 
settlements.33 
 
Second, the debate about French foreign policy vis-à-vis Israel and Palestine has become 
entangled with the domestic discussion about anti-Semitism, which remains a challenge in 
French society (see Mayer, 2018). There is a trend, supported by some groups such as CRIF, to 
scrutinise all criticisms of Israel as a form of anti-Semitism.34 According to the 2017 report on 
racism, antisemitism and discrimination by the Commission Nationale Consultative des Droits 
de l’Homme, anti-Semitism in France continues to be linked to the old stereotypes linking the 
Jews to money and power. The so-called nouvelle judéophobie revolving around a negative 
image of Israel and Zionism remains in the minority. The report also warns against mixing 
racism and anti-Semitism with the criticism of Israel and its policies.35 
                                                          
33 Cf. some of the campaigns that have been launched over time: https://plateforme-palestine.org/Campagnes-
706 and http://www.france-palestine.org/+-Campagnes-Actions-+  
34 E.g., http://www.crif.org/fr/prisesdeparole/discours-de-cloture-7eme-convention-nationale-du-crif-francis-
kalifat  
35 In particular, pp. 15-16 and section 2.4. The full report is available at: 
http://www.cncdh.fr/sites/default/files/cncdh_rapport_2017_bat_basse_definition.pdf.  
  
 
Despite this warning, the public debate in France can at times use anti-Semitism, anti-Zionism 
and criticism of Israel interchangeably. Macron too stated that anti-Zionism is ‘the mere 
reinvention of anti-Semitism’ in his discourse on the occasion of the remembrance of the raid 
of Vel d’Hiv in July 2017.36 Similarly, the case of the Boycott Divestment and Sanction (BDS) 
movement seems to point towards the criminalization of the criticism of Israel and its policies.37 
Already in 2010 and 2012 the Minister of Justice issued two circulaires, i.e., two administrative 
documents, to public prosecutors asking to report and prosecute those individuals calling for 
the boycott of Israeli products.38 Since 2010 there have been trials against BDS activists, 
without a common line of judgement across cases (Interview 3). In October 2015 the Cour de 
Cassation confirmed the accusations against BDS activists on the basis of articles 225-2 of the 
criminal code (obstacle to the normal exercise of economic activity) and art. 24.8 of the law 
1881 on freedom of press, which includes the crime of provocation to discrimination, to hatred 
or to violence against a person or a group of people due to their origin, their belonging (or not) 
to an ethnic group, a nation, a race or a specific religion.39 Moreover, President Hollande 
proudly declared, at the annual dinner of the CRIF on 22 February 2017, that ‘France is the 
only country to have a law that forbids the appeal to boycott and I will assure you that we will 
enforce it’.40   
 
It is quite unlikely that the gap between French rhetoric about the occupation and its policy 
practice vis-à-vis Israel will be closed in the short term. Politicians are caught between their 
rhetorical and principled position vis-à-vis the two-state solution and the illegality of Israeli 
settlements in the occupied Palestinian territories on the one hand, and the existing practice 
towards Israel, on the other. While the tension has been partially solved by discussing the issue 
of Palestinians and occupation within the EU and the UN, domestic pressures are challenging 
French foreign policy and the sustainability of this mismatch in the long run. Foreign policy 
practices are increasingly entangled with domestic policies and politics. ‘Contestation from 
below’, i.e., the actions and narratives of domestic societal actors, tends to increasingly shape 
the contour of foreign policy and transforming it into a domestic issue. 
 
 
List of interviews 
1. Former diplomat, 24/10/2017 
2. Diplomat, 13/10/2017 
3. NGO representative, 18/10/2017 
4. NGO representative, 05/10/2017 
5. Expert, 06/09/2016 
6. Historian, 19/02/2018 
7. Diplomat, 16/05/2018 
 
 
 
Bibliography 
 
                                                          
36 http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/discours-du-president-de-la-republique/  
37 Cf. Bicchi 2018 in this special issue for similar trends in the British context. 
38 CRIM-AP n°09-900-A4 (12/02/2010) and CRIM-AP n° 2012-0034-A4 (15/05/2012).  
39 See also Médiapart : enquête sur BDS, available at: http://ujfp.org/spip.php?article4802  
40 https://jssnews.com/2017/03/01/discours-integral-de-francois-hollande-au-diner-du-crif-22022017/  
  
Allen, D., & Pijpers, A. (1984). European Foreign Policy-Making and the Arab-Israeli 
Conflict. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. 
Benraad, M. (2014). France’s fascination with Israel and Palestine. European Council on 
Foreign Relations. Retrieved from 
http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_frances_fascination_with_israel_and_palestine290 
Bicchi, F., & Voltolini, B. (2018). Europe, the Green Line and the Issue of the Israeli-
Palestinian Border: Closing the Gap between Discourse and Practice? Geopolitics, 23(1), 
124–146.  
Bozo, F. (2012). La Politique étrangère de la France depuis 1945. Editions Flammarion.  
Filiu, J.-P. (2009). François Mitterrand and the Palestinians: 1956–95. Journal of Palestine 
Studies, 38(2), 24–41. 
Ghiles Meilhac, S. (2011). Le CRIF. de la résistance juive à la tentation du lobby, de 1943 à 
nos jours. Paris: Robert Laffont. 
Gresh, A., & Aldeguer, H. (2017). Un chant d’amour. Paris: La Découverte.  
Leveau, R. (2003). France’s Arab Policy. In C. L. Brown (Ed.), Diplomacy in the Middle East: 
The International Relations of Regional and Outside Powers (pp. 3–20). London/New York: 
I. B. Tauris. 
Lovatt, H. (2016). EU differentiation and the push for peace in Israel-Palestine. London: 
ECFR. Retrieved from 
http://www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/eu_differentiation_and_the_push_for_peace_in_
israel_palestine7163 
Lovatt, H., & Toaldo, M. (2015). EU Differentiation and Israeli settlements. London: ECFR. 
Retrieved from 
http://www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/eu_differentiation_and_israeli_settlements3076 
Mayer, N. (2018, May 16). Antisémitisme, un état des lieux. AOC - Analyse Opinion Critique. 
Retrieved from https://aoc.media/analyse/2018/05/16/antisemitisme-etat-lieux 
Miller, R. (2011). Inglorious Disarray: Europe, Israel and the Palestinians Since 1967. 
London: C Hurst & Co Publishers Ltd. 
Müller, P. (2012). EU Foreign Policymaking and the Middle East Conflict: The 
Europeanization of National Foreign Policy. London: Routledge. 
Nikolov, K. Y. (2014). ASHTON’S SECOND HAT: The EU Funding Guidelines on Israel as 
a Post-Lisbon Instrument of European Foreign Policy Making. Diplomacy, 11, 168–188. 
Nouzille, V. (2018). Histoires secrètes. France-Israel, 1948-2018. France: éditions Les Liens 
qui Libèrent. 
Pouponneau, F. (2015). La politique française de non-prolifération nucléaire. De la division 
du travail diplomatique. Brussels: Peter Lang. 
Schillo, F. (2008). La politique française à l’égard d’israël, 1946-1959. Paris, Institut d’études 
politiques, Paris.  
Sieffert, D. (2004). Israël-Palestine, une passion française. Paris: La Découverte.  
Vaïsse, M. (2009). La politique arabe. In La puissance ou l’influence ? : La France dans le 
monde depuis 1958 (pp. 351–416). Paris: Fayard. 
 
